There are two methods commonly used to estimate volatility.
The first method is by estimating historical volatility; volatility is calculated by using data from the recent past with the assumption that what has happened recently is indicative of the future.
A second method to estimate volatility is based on observed market prices of interest rate derivatives (e.g., swaptions, caps, floors). This approach is called implied volatility.
An arbitrage opportunity is a transaction that involves no cash outlay that results in a riskless profit.
There are two types of arbitrage opportunities. We will use the following four assets for illustrative purposes.
||Payoff in One Year
The first type of arbitrage opportunity is often called value additivity. It means that the value of the whole equals the sum of the values of the parts. Consider two risk-free investments with payoffs one year from today and the prices today provided in the table above. Asset A is a simple risk-free zero-coupon bond that pays off one dollar and is priced today at 0.952381 ($1/1.05). Asset B is a portfolio of 105 units of Asset A that pays off $105 one year from today and is priced today at $95. The portfolio does not equal the sum of the parts. The portfolio (Asset B) is cheaper than buying 105 units of Asset A at a price of $100 and then combining. An astute investor would sell 105 units of Asset A for 105 × $0.952381 = $100 while simultaneously buying one portfolio Asset B for $95. This position generates a certain $5 today ($100-95) and generates net $0 one year from today because cash inflow for Asset B matches the amount for the 105 units of Asset A sold. An investor would engage in this trade over and over again until the prices adjust.
The second type of arbitrage opportunity is often called dominance. A financial asset with a risk-free payoff in the future must have a positive price today. Consider two assets, C and D, that are risk-free zero-coupon bonds. Their payoffs are displayed in the table above. On careful review, it appears that Asset D is cheap relative to Asset C. If both assets are risk-free, they should have the same discount rate. To make money, sell two units of Asset C at a price of $200 and use the proceeds to purchase one unit of Asset D for $200. The construction of the portfolio involves no net cash outlay today. Although it requires zero dollars to construct today, the portfolio generates $10 one year from today. Asset D will generate a $220 cash inflow whereas the two units of Asset C sold will produce a cash outflow of $210.
This existence of both types of arbitrage opportunities is transitory. Investors aware of this mispricing will demand the securities in question in unlimited quantities. Something must change in order to restore stability. Prices will adjust until there are no arbitrage opportunities.
The central idea of financial economics is that market prices will adjust until there are no opportunities for arbitrage. We will define shortly what is meant by an arbitrage opportunity, but for now think of it as “free money.” Prices will adjust until there is no free money to be acquired. Arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of violations of the law of one price. The law of one price states that two goods that are perfect substitutes must sell for the same current price in the absence of transaction costs. Two goods that are identical, trading side by side, are priced the same. Otherwise, if it were costless to trade, one would simultaneously buy at the lower price and sell at the higher price. The riskless profit is the difference in the prices. An individual would repeat this transaction without limit until the two prices converge. An implication of these market forces is deceptively straightforward and basic. If you do not put up any of your own money and take no risk, your expected return should be zero.
The preferred habitat theory is similar to the segmented markets theory in proposing that many borrowers and lenders have strong preferences for particular maturities but it does not assert that yields at different maturities are determined independently of each other.
However, the theory contends that if the expected additional returns to be gained become large enough, institutions will be willing to deviate from their preferred maturities or habitats. For example, if the expected returns on longer-term securities exceed those on short-term securities by a large enough margin, money market funds will lengthen the maturities of their assets. And if the excess returns expected from buying short-term securities become large enough, life insurance companies might stop limiting themselves to long-term securities and place a larger part of their portfolios in shorter-term investments.
The preferred habitat theory is based on the realistic notion that agents and institutions will accept additional risk in return for additional expected returns. In accepting elements of both the segmented markets theory and the unbiased expectations theory, yet rejecting their extreme polar positions, the preferred habitat theory moves closer to explaining real-world phenomena. In this theory, both market expectations and the institutional factors emphasized in the segmented markets theory influence the term structure of interest rates.
Unlike expectations theory and liquidity preference theory, segmented markets theory allows for lender and borrower preferences to influence the shape of the yield curve. The result is that yields are not a reflection of expected spot rates or liquidity premiums. Rather, they are solely a function of the supply and demand for funds of a particular maturity. That is, each maturity sector can be thought of as a segmented market in which yield is determined independently from the yields that prevail in other maturity segments.
The theory is consistent with a world where there are asset/liability management constraints, either regulatory or self-imposed. In such a world, investors might restrict their investment activity to a maturity sector that provides the best match for the maturity of their liabilities. Doing so avoids the risks associated with an asset/liability mismatch.
For example, because life insurers sell long-term liabilities against themselves in the form of life insurance contracts, they tend to be most active as buyers in the long end of the bond market. Similarly, because the liabilities of pension plans are long term, they typically invest in long-term securities. Why would they invest short term given that those returns might decline while the cost of their liabilities stays fixed? In contrast, money market funds would be limited to investing in debt with maturity of one year or less, in general.
In summary, the segmented markets theory assumes that market participants are either unwilling or unable to invest in anything other than securities of their preferred maturity. It follows that the yield of securities of a particular maturity is determined entirely by the supply and demand for funds of that particular maturity.
Liquidity preference theory is a theory that explains the term structure of interest rates. The theory asserts that liquidity premiums exist to compensate investors for the added interest rate risk they face when lending long term and that these premiums increase with maturity. Thus, given an expectation of unchanging short-term spot rates, liquidity preference theory predicts an upward-sloping yield curve. The forward rate provides an estimate of the expected spot rate that is biased upward by the amount of the liquidity premium, which invalidates the unbiased expectations theory.
Compare to the unbiased expectations theory which leaves no room for risk aversion, liquidity preference theory attempts to account for it.
For example, the US Treasury offers bonds that mature in 30 years. However, the majority of investors have an investment horizon that is shorter than 30 years. For investors to hold these bonds, they would demand a higher return for taking the risk that the yield curve changes and that they must sell the bond prior to maturity at an uncertain price. That incrementally higher return is the liquidity premium. Note that this premium is not to be confused with a yield premium for the lack of liquidity that thinly traded bonds may bear. Rather, it is a premium applying to all long-term bonds, including those with deep markets.
Liquidity preference theory fails to offer a complete explanation of the term structure. Rather, it simply argues for the existence of liquidity premiums. For example, a downward-sloping yield curve could still be consistent with the existence of liquidity premiums if one of the factors underlying the shape of the curve is an expectation of deflation (i.e., a negative rate of inflation due to monetary or fiscal policy actions). Expectations of sharply declining spot rates may also result in a downward-sloping yield curve if the expected decline in interest rates is severe enough to offset the effect of the liquidity premiums.
In summary, liquidity preference theory claims that lenders require a liquidity premium as an incentive to lend long term. Thus, forward rates derived from the current yield curve provide an upwardly biased estimate of expected future spot rates. Although downward-sloping or hump-shaped yield curves may sometimes occur, the existence of liquidity premiums implies that the yield curve will typically be upward sloping.
One branch of traditional term structure theory focuses on interpreting term structure shape in terms of investors’ expectations. Historically, the first such theory is known as the unbiased expectations theory or pure expectations theory. It says that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate; its broadest interpretation is that bonds of any maturity are perfect substitutes for one another. For example, buying a bond with a maturity of five years and holding it for three years has the same expected return as buying a three-year bond or buying a series of three one-year bonds.
The predictions of the unbiased expectations theory are consistent with the assumption of risk neutrality. In a risk-neutral world, investors are unaffected by uncertainty and risk premiums do not exist. Every security is risk free and yields the risk-free rate for that particular maturity. Although such an assumption leads to interesting results, it clearly is in conflict with the large body of evidence that shows that investors are risk averse.
A theory that is similar but more rigorous than the unbiased expectations theory is the local expectations theory. Rather than asserting that every maturity strategy has the same expected return over a given investment horizon, this theory instead contends that the expected return for every bond over short time periods is the risk-free rate. This conclusion results from an assumed no-arbitrage condition in which bond pricing does not allow for traders to earn arbitrage profits.
The primary way that the local expectations theory differs from the unbiased expectations theory is that it can be extended to a world characterized by risk. Although the theory requires that risk premiums be nonexistent for very short holding periods, no such restrictions are placed on longer-term investments. Thus, the theory is applicable to both risk-free as well as risky bonds.
In endogenous term structure models, the current term structure of rates is an output rather than an input of the model. Examples of endogenous term structure models include the Vasicek model, the Dothan model, and the Cox-Ingersoll-ross model.
The Cox–Ingersoll–Ross (CIR) model is a partial equilibrium term structure model that describes the evolution of interest rates. It assumes that interest rates are mean reverting and interest rate volatility is directly related to the level of interest rates.
The CIR model assumes that every individual has to make consumption and investment decisions with their limited capital. Investing in the productive process may lead to higher consumption in the following period, but it requires sacrificing today’s consumption. The individual must determine his or her optimal trade-off assuming that he or she can borrow and lend in the capital market. Ultimately, interest rates will reach a market equilibrium rate at which no one needs to borrow or lend. The CIR model can explain interest rate movements in terms of an individual’s preferences for investment and consumption as well as the risks and returns of the productive processes of the economy.
As a result of this analysis, the model shows how the short-term interest rate is related to the risks facing the productive processes of the economy. Assuming that an individual requires a term premium on the long-term rate, the model shows that the short-term rate can determine the entire term structure of interest rates and the valuation of interest rate–contingent claims.
To price a swap, we need to determine the present value of cash flows for each leg of the transaction. In an interest rate swap, the fixed leg is fairly straightforward because the cash flows are specified by the coupon rate set at the time of the agreement. Pricing the floating leg is more complex because, by definition, the cash flows change with future changes in interest rates. The forward rate for each floating payment date is calculated by using the forward curves.