Louise Yamada on oversold in a bear market

技术分析师Louise Yamada对股票市场的未来走势并不是很乐观。她自己发明的一个技术分析指标(比较上涨和下跌股票的交易量)在过去的三个月中,很长时间处于超卖(oversold)的区域。


I think it’s important to understand that when you’re in a bull market, an oversold situation can be a very temporary registration and people tend to say ‘buy the dip’. But when you start going into a weakening market, a bear market for instance, the oversold can remain oversold and it is the empirical evidence of selling pressure. So all of these rallies that we’ve had since June when this indicator went oversold have been evidence with selling into strength. So people were taking their money out on the rallies that we’ve seen over the past three months.

via: Bloomberg

From Jackson Hole Meeting 2015


Central Bankers Shouldn’t Yearn for Good Old Days That Never Existed: Fed Conference Paper

The economy is far too complex to be described by simple mathematical models and equations, and the world’s central bankers shouldn’t seek to return to a mythical past when monetary policy was a straightforward affair, economists argued in research presented Saturday at the Kansas City Fed’s symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyo.

Unlike Japan, U.S. and Europe Probably Will Dodge Deflation: Fed Conference Paper

Inflation has remained stubbornly low in the U.S., Japan and the eurozone for years. But while Japan faces a serious possibility of deflation, the risk is far lower for the U.S. and Europe, according to research presented at the Kansas City Fed’s economic symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyo.

Fed’s Fischer: ‘Good Reason’ to Think U.S. Inflation Will Move Higher

The Fed‘s Stanley Fischer said there is “good reason” to think sluggish U.S. inflation will firm and move back toward the U.S. central bank’s 2% annual target, touching on a significant assessment facing the Fed ahead of its September policy meeting.

BOE Remains on Course to Begin Raising Rates Early Next Year, Gov. Carney Says

The Bank of England remains on course to begin slowly raising interest rates early next year despite the recent turmoil in global financial markets, Gov. Mark Carney said.

India’s Rajan: ‘Political Economy’ Important But Quiet Issue for Central Bankers

The role of politics and history is a little-discussed but important force in determining the goals and tactics of economic policy makers, Reserve Bank of India Gov. Raghuram Rajan said.



前美国财政部部长劳伦斯·萨默斯(Larry Summers)和全球最大对冲基金创始人雷·达里奥(Ray Dalio)本周都发表类似的言论,表示新一轮QE可以帮助对抗通货紧缩的危险和缓解金融市场的紧张气氛。

达里奥在周一给客户的一封题为《The Dangerous Long Bias and the End of the Supercycle and Why We Believe That the Next Big Fed Move Will Be to Ease (Via QE) Rather Than to Tighten》信中写道:

As you know, the Fed and our templates for how the economic machine works are quite different so our views about what is happening and what should be done are quite different.

To us the economy works like a perpetual motion machine in which short-term interest rates are kept below the returns of other asset classes and the returns of other asset classes are more volatile (because they have longer duration) than cash. That relationship exists because a) central banks want interest rates to be lower than the returns that those who are borrowing to invest can generate from that borrowing in order to make their activities profitable and b) longer-term assets have more duration that makes them more volatile than cash, which is perceived as risk, and investors will demand higher returns for riskier assets.

Given that, let’s now imagine how the machine works to affect debt, asset prices, and economic activity.

Because short-term interest rates are normally below the rates of return of longer-term assets, you’d expect people to borrow at the short-term interest rate and buy long-term assets to profit from the spread. That is what they do. These long-term assets might be businesses, the assets that make these businesses work well, equities, etc. People also borrow for consumption. Borrowing to buy is tempting because, over the short term, one can have more without a penalty and, because of the borrowing and buying, the assets bought tend to go up, which rewards the leveraged borrower. That fuels asset price appreciation and most economic activity. It also leads to the building of leveraged long positions.

Of course, if short-term interest rates were always lower than the returns of other asset classes (i.e., the spreads were always positive), everyone would run out and borrow cash and own higher returning assets to the maximum degree possible. So there are occasional “bad” periods when that is not the case, at which time both people with leveraged long positions and the economy do badly. Central banks typically determine when these bad periods occur, just as they determine when the good periods occur, by affecting the spreads. Typically they narrow the spreads (by raising interest rates) when the growth in demand is growing faster than the growth in capacity to satisfy it and the amount of unused capacity (e.g., the GDP gap) is tight (which they do to curtail inflation), and they widen the spreads when the opposite configuration exists, which causes cycles. That’s what the Fed is now thinking of doing — i.e., raising interest rates based on how central banks classically manage the classic cycle. In our opinion, that is because they are paying too much attention to that cycle and not enough attention to secular forces.

As a result of these short-term (typically 5 to 8 year) expansions punctuated by years of less contraction, this leveraged long bias, along with asset prices and economic activity, increases in several steps forward for each step backwards. We call each step forward the expansion phase of each short-term debt cycle (or the expansion phase of each business cycle) and we call each step back the contraction phase of each short-term debt cycle (or the recession phase of the business cycle). In other words, because there are a few steps forward for every one step back, a long-term debt cycle results. Debts rise relative to incomes until they can’t rise any more.

Interest rate declines help to extend the process because lower interest rates a) cause asset prices to rise because they lower the discount rate that future cash flows are discounted at, thus raising the present value of these assets, b) make it more affordable to borrow, and c) reduce the interest costs of servicing debt. For example, since 1981, every cyclical peak and every cyclical low in interest rates was lower than the one before it until short-term interest rates hit 0%, at which time credit growth couldn’t be increased by lowering interest rates so central banks printed money and bought bonds, leading the sellers of those bonds to use the cash they received to buy assets that had higher expected returns, which drove those asset prices up and drove their expected returns down to levels that left the spreads relatively low.

That’s where we find ourselves now — i.e., interest rates around the world are at or near 0%, spreads are relatively narrow (because asset prices have been pushed up) and debt levels are high. As a result, the ability of central banks to ease is limited, at a time when the risks are more on the downside than the upside and most people have a dangerous long bias. Said differently, the risks of the world being at or near the end of its long-term debt cycle are significant.

That is what we are most focused on. We believe that is more important than the cyclical influences that the Fed is apparently paying more attention to.

While we don’t know if we have just passed the key turning point, we think that it should now be apparent that the risks of deflationary contractions are increasing relative to the risks of inflationary expansion because of these secular forces. These long-term debt cycle forces are clearly having big effects on China, oil producers, and emerging countries which are overly indebted in dollars and holding a huge amount of dollar assets — at the same time as the world is holding large leveraged long positions.

While, in our opinion, the Fed has over-emphasized the importance of the “cyclical” (i.e., the short-term debt/business cycle) and underweighted the importance of the “secular” (i.e., the long-term debt/supercycle), they will react to what happens. Our risk is that they could be so committed to their highly advertised tightening path that it will be difficult for them to change to a significantly easier path if that should be required.


To be clear, we are not saying that we don’t believe that there will be a tightening before there is an easing. We are saying that we believe that there will be a big easing before a big tightening. We don’t consider a 25-50 basis point tightening to be a big tightening. Rather, it would be tied with the smallest tightening ever. As shown in the table below, the average tightening over the last century has been 4.4%, and the smallest was in 1936, 0.5%— when the US was last going through a deleveraging phase of the long term debt cycle. The smallest tightening since WWII was 2.8% (from 1954 to 1957). To be clear, while we might see a tiny tightening akin to what was experienced in 1936, we doubt that we will see anything much larger before we see a major easing via QE. By the way, note that since 1980 every cyclical low in interest rates and every cyclical peak was lower than the one before it until interest rates hit 0%, when QE needed to be used instead. That is because lower interest rates were required to bring about each new re-leveraging and pick-up in growth and because secular disinflationary forces have been so strong (until printing money needed to be used instead). We believe those secular forces remain in place and that that pattern will persist.

via: Business Insider


彼得·伯恩斯坦(Peter L. Bernstein)2008年在《Economist on Wall Street》一书新版开头的介绍中写道:

The objective of equity investing is survival. In the patois of today’s professional investors, the objective of survival is just a straightforward way of saying that risk management is the secret of success. We have no control over what kinds of returns we will earn; we can only estimate, figure, and then hope. Risk is the key variable under our control.

Making a killing is a hope, not a strategy. The same goes for trying to beat the market. Taking risks so high that all can be lost is a strategy, but it is not the strategy I would choose.


亿万富翁交易员保罗·都铎·琼斯(Paul Tudor Jones II) 在接受励志演说家托尼·罗宾斯采访时讨论200日均线

One principle for sure would be: get out of anything that falls below the 200-day moving average.

I teach an undergrad class at the University of Virginia, and I tell my students, “I’m going to save you from going to business school. Here, you’re getting a $100k class, and I’m going to give it to you in two thoughts, okay? You don’t need to go to business school; you’ve only got to remember two things.”

The first is, you always want to be with whatever the predominant trend is. My metric for everything I look at is the 200-day moving average of closing prices. I’ve seen too many things go to zero, stocks and commodities. The whole trick in investing is: “How do I keep from losing everything?” If you use the 200-day moving average rule, then you get out. You play defense, and you get out.

via: MONEY Master the Game

Bridgewater on the China’s Stock Market

桥水基金(Bridgewater Associates)在给客户的信中写道:

中国市场的价格走势是由毫无经验的投机者主导的新兴股票市场的典型特征。新参与者们现在发现在这样的市场中赚钱是困难的。(The Chinese market’s price action is typical for a newly developing equity market that is dominated by unsophisticated speculators. New participants are now discovering that making money in the markets is difficult.)

更新:桥水发出更为细节的声明,说明自己的中国经济的看法。via: WSJ





保罗·都铎·琼斯在判断哪些股票是失败者的时候,并不是从自己的成本,而是股价的近期高点起算的 — 那才是人人都能看得见的参照点。